ATTACKS ON EVENT TRACING FOR WINDOWS: TECHNIQUES AND COUNTERMEASURES

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
Motivation and Aims

- Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) is a **crucial** component of Windows security
- Most Antivirus and security solutions depend on data from ETW to protect the system
- Attackers are motivated to attack ETW to prevent being detected
- Large impact of such attacks on system security
- Research in cooperation with ESET
 eset

Event Tracing for Windows (ETW)

- Event logging platform integrated in Microsoft Windows since Windows Vista
- Live event processing, event storage and filtering
- Logs events from:
 - Windows kernel
 - System programs and components
 - User programs
- Provides these events to:
 - System tools (event viewer)
 - Monitoring tools
 - Resource management
 - Antimalware and security software


• Disabling this functionality **blinds most system** monitoring and security tools



Schema displaying the operation of the ETW framework

Analysis of Specific Attacks Against ETW

- Malicious rootkit designed to blind security software by stealthily disabling event logging
- Attributed to the Lazarus APT group affiliated with North Korea
- Sophisticated nation-sponsored threat actor
- Elevation of privilege via BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver)
- Abusing vulnerable third party kernel drivers to gain access to kernel memory
- Overwriting ETW configuration directly in kernel memory to disable logging hard to detect by conventional means
- This makes subsequent malicious activity harder to identify for security software




Detecting the attacks

- Created an implemented two methods for detecting such attacks on ETW
- Statistical approach from <u>user-mode</u>, monitoring message volumes per provider. A drop in message volume indicates a possible ongoing attack
- Monitoring ETW structures from kernelmode, detecting changes to ETW configuration using a kernel-mode driver and alerting the user via a **usermode app**

Mitigating the attacks

- Proposed two preventive measures Expanding windows kernel protection mechanisms (kernel patch protection) verifying checksums of memory regions and using a secure api to update them when the data changes
- Implementing access control in kernel **memory**, for example by segmentation as demonstrated by the <u>MemoryRanger</u> tool (github.com/lgorKorkin/MemoryRanger).





- Implemented and evaluated a Proof of Concept based on these attacks
- Created and implemented a two methods of reliably detecting and identifying such blinding attacks against ETW
- Proposed two approaches to prevent such
- attacks from succeeding in the future
- Results were published on two conferences
- Real-world impact in pointing out weaknesses in the ETW framework

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Conclusion

- Analyzed a series of sophisticated blinding attacks against ETW
- Described undocumented parts of the Windows kernel and the ETW framework

Publications

This work was presented as part of two conference contributions [1, 2] and published as part of a conference journal article [1].

1. KÁLNAI, Peter; HAVRÁNEK, Matěj. Lazarus & BYOVD: evil to the Windows core. In VirusBulletin conference. 2022. 2. KÁLNAI, Peter; HAVRÁNEK, Matěj. Lazarus declares war on system monitoring. In AVAR conference. 2022.